Energy — oil & gas in Tunisia.

Energy — oil & gas

Tunisia's proven oil reserves are 1.4 billion barrels; gas reserves are 0.4 tcf. Current production (2026) is approximately 27,000 barrels a day of oil and roughly 1.1 bcf a day of gas—both declining sharply year-on-year.

At first half 2025, oil production was down 8.8 percent year-on-year and met only 27.5 percent of domestic demand. Gas output has collapsed by almost 60 percent since peaking at 310 million cubic feet per day in 2010.

Gas import dependence hit 74.8 percent in first half 2025, with all imports supplied by Algeria via TransMed pipeline and spot LNG. Energy independence stood at 38 percent end-1H 2025. This is a net-energy-importer dynamic, not a technology-buyer opportunity for expanded production.

The Tunisian Company for Petroleum Activities (ETAP) is the state-owned NOC. All exploration acreage and production licenses flow through ETAP-led consortia with IOCs. The petroleum regulator is the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Green Transition. Fiscal regime is production-sharing contracts, with government take roughly 50–55 percent.

Eni (Italy) has significant operations via the Trans Tunisian Pipeline Company (TTPC) which transports Algerian gas through Tunisia, and operates production assets alongside ETAP. British Gas (BG, UK) operates the Miskar field, the largest natural gas field in Tunisia; production is declining. Panoro Energy (UK-listed independent) operates TPS Assets in the Sfax region with production in the 3,000–4,000 barrels-per-day range. OMV (Austria) maintains limited upstream presence and made a new discovery in the Sirte Basin (straddling Libya-Tunisia border) in late 2025.

Brownfield with decline: The Gulf of Gabes offshore fields are mature water-cut systems in terminal decline. Sfax onshore concessions are small producers with limited upside. There is no active exploration play or frontier acreage being shopped to majors. Recent activity is focused on slowing decline, not growth.

ETAP technical committees focus on lifecycle extension and cost reduction in existing assets. Panoro's capex is limited; technology decisions are opportunistic. Eni's TTPC is midstream/downstream; upstream tech evaluation is secondary.

Current operator focus is on legacy-field cost management rather than new-technology adoption; this may shift within a 3–5 year horizon.

The realistic near-term opportunities are: consultancy on ETAP's energy-import-substitution strategy (2026–2030); technology transfer and training for Miskar and TPS Assets lifecycle extension; and ad-hoc advisory on tight-gas development if OMV or another IOC secures southern Ghadames Basin acreage in 2026–2027.

Risks are structural. IOCs are exiting or downsizing Tunisia operations. Without a discovery or a regional gas pipeline to Europe, IOC technology investment will remain minimal. Algeria supplies all of Tunisia's imported gas; supply disruption would threaten energy security and IOC confidence. The Saied administration's priority is economic diversification, not hydrocarbon maximisation.